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I.

INTRODUCTION

American constitutional interpretation has seemingly overlooked fecund historical sources that could facilitate realization
of the ideals upon which the government was founded. By considering the objectives that were articulated in the Declaration of
Independence and the Preamble' of the Constitution, not only
can interpretation of the Constitution be enhanced generally,
but, in particular, the Ninth Amendment can be reclaimed as an
integral component of the Bill of Rights.
The objection 2 that has yielded decades, indeed nearly two
centuries, of continuing desuetude with respect to the Ninth
Amendment is the apparent lack of a reference point for an understanding of retained rights. If it is a reference point that is
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The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of their research assistants,
Patricia A. Schiripo, Susan Halper, and DeborahJ. Fennelly, in the development of
this article.
I The authors recognize the rules of A Uniform System of Citation, but prefer to
capitalize various sections of this article in accordance with Supreme Court
practice.
2 One scholar of the Constitution has observed that "John Hart Ely rightly
identifie[d] the task of commentators as the development of a 'principled approach
to judicial enforcement of the Constitution's open-ended provisions . . . .' In his
view, the judiciary can properly seek to assure 'broad participation, not simply in
the processes of government but in the benefits generated by those processes as
well.' " Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 665 (1980) (citations omitted) (quoting Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 52
IND. L.J. 399, 448 (1978)). See also Ely, Foreword: On DiscoveringFundamental Values,
92 HARV. L. REV. 5-6 (1978) (discussing the Warren Court's concern with ensuring
broad participation).
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lacking, it is logical and sensible to look to contemporaneous
sources that illuminate what the framers included within the compass of the Ninth Amendment. Because the concept of retained
rights has a distinct philosophical connotation, 3 the Declaration
and the Preamble would be the most dispositive as contemporaneous articulations of the philosophical and jurisprudential substance of the Ninth Amendment. Although such historical
underpinnings are important as a point of departure, it is essential that they not be considered as the end of the inquiry. Indeed
it would be unfortunate if interpreters of the Constitution were
bound by the meaning of "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness" or the "Blessings of Liberty" as they were understood in
1791. Consistent with the Preamble's call to strive for "a more
perfect Union," constitutional interpretation of necessity must
evolve and, hopefully, progress.4
While the Supreme Court continues to recognize unenumerated rights under various provisions of the Constitution, its
reliance on the Ninth Amendment has been infrequent.5 Nevertheless, many Justices of the Court have recognized the viability
of the Ninth Amendment and have referred to it specifically as a
source of rights since the noted concurring opinion of Justice
Goldberg in Griswold v. Connecticut.6 The most widely recognized
3 Moore, The Ninth Amendment-Its Origins and Meaning, 7 NEw ENG. L. REV. 215,
218 (1972).
4 Justice Thurgood Marshall commented that "[faor a sense of the evolving nature of the Constitution we need look no further than the first three words of the
document's Preamble: 'We the People.' When the Founding Fathers used this
phrase in 1787, they did not have in mind the majority of America's citizens." Marshall, The Constitution's Bicentennial: Commemorating the Wrong Document?, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 1337, 1338 (1987). See also Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
469 (1897) (the study of law is the equivalent to the study of history). Judge Morris
Arnold has pointed out that "[o]ne's comprehension of natural law.., is capable of
evolution." Arnold, Doing More Than Remembering The Ninth Amendment," 64 Ctii.[]KENT L. REV. 265, 267 (1988).
5 Justice Goldberg, concurring in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 490
n.6 (1965), noted that the Court had only referred to the amendment thrice before.
He cited Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 330-31 (1936),
Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennesssee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118, 14344 (1939), and United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94-96 (1947). Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492-93 (1957) and Woods, Housing Expediter v.
Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948), should also have been included. See
also International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 745 n.3, 781, 783 n.5
(Black, J., dissenting), 797 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (1961) (referring to Ninth
Amendment); Slagle v. Ohio, 366 U.S. 259, 261-62 n.4 (1961) (referring to Ninth
Amendment); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 511 (1857) (Campbell, J., concurring) (referring to Ninth Amendment).
6 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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of these rights is that of familial privacy,7 but political freedom 8
and the right of the public to attend criminal trials 9 have also
found support in the Ninth Amendment.
The Ninth Amendment takes on substantial significance insofar as attempts to establish education, 10 housing," and survival' 2 as fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
have been unsuccessful. Recognition of such "retained rights" is
based on the premise that affirmative duties have been placed on
the government by the Constitution "to form a more perfect
Union." This aspirational aspect of interpretation gives the Constitution its dynamism and more closely reflects its spirit.
II.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE ADOPTION OF THE
NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE WELTANSCHAUUNG
OF THE FRAMERS

The Ninth Amendment provides that "[t]he enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people."' 3 These words are
the culmination of four years of vigorous congressional debate.' 4
Without them, it is doubtful that the Bill of Rights would ever
have been adopted in this country.' 5
Delegates to many of the state ratification conventions disagreed as to the need for a bill of rights. Antifederalists based
their attack upon the Constitution on its absence. They were
joined by pro-ratification elements which were generally concerned that the federal government, under the "necessary and
proper" clause, the power of taxation, and other newly
granted powers, could encroach upon the liberties previously
guaranteed by the states. As a result, several states proposed
numerous amendments to the Constitution, some aimed at
7 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 n.12 (1977) (plurality opinion); Smith v.
Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 n.46 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
8 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 59-60 n.67 (1976) (per curiam).
9 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80 (1980).
10 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
11 See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
12 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
13 U.S. CONST.amend. IX.
14 The first ten amendments were adopted simultaneously. H. Doc. No. 100-94,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
15 As early as 1787, a Bill of Rights was urged by James Madison, George Mason, Elbridge Gerry, and Roger Sherman. See Scott,Journalof the FederalConvention,
reprinted in, JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 717 (1895 ed.).
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crippling the power of the new government, but most either
specifying individual rights or promoting government
action.' 6
James Madison, the author of the Ninth Amendment and the
father of the Bill of Rights, was faced with the argument that a bill of
rights would be superfluous because the Constitution established a
government derived from the people. Alexander Hamilton, Oliver
Ellsworth, and James Wilson, among others, thus argued that the
government could only use its limited powers as specified and not to
encroach on reserved rights."7 The criticism that ultimately compelled Madison to submit to the House of Representatives what was,
in its revised form, 8 later to become the Ninth Amendment to the
Constitution, was the argument of Alexander Hamilton:
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in
the extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution, but would even be
dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers
which are not granted; and on this very account, would afford
a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why
declare that things shall not be done when there is no power
to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of
the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by
which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that
such a provision will confer a regulating power; but it is evito usurp, a plausident that it would furnish, to men disposed
9
ble pretense for claiming that power.'
It is evident, here in the Hamiltonian position and throughout the
writings of all the framers, that a fundamental postulate of American
constitutional law is the assumption that governmental power derives from the people, and not from any body or individual.
16 Ringold, The History of the Enactment of the Ninth Amendment and Its Recent Development, 8 TULSA L.J. 1, 3-4 (1972).
17 L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 270 (1988). See
also Mason, Objections to the Constitution of Governmentformed by the Convention in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 11-13 (H. Storing ed. 1981) (raising the concern that
specification of federal governmental powers would jeopardize the rights of the
people).
18 Before revision, Madison's original proposal provided: "The exceptions here
or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so
construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people,
or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution." 1 ANNALS OF
CONGRESS 439 U. Gales ed. 1834). The discussion of both rights and powers in the
original proposal was evidently bifurcated to comprise the essential components of
what ultimately became the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
19 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 579 (A. Hamilton) U. Cooke ed. 1961).
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The primary fear of the opponents, then, is simply expressed by
the familiar legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.20 Thus, it
was felt, that the inclusion of some rights necessarily meant the exclusion of others. Madison contended:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it
would disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those
rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were
consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill
of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be
guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen2may see by
turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution. '
And so the Ninth Amendment was introduced as a safeguard against
governmental intrusion, executive or legislative, on rights not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.
Analysis of the Ninth Amendment would not be complete without considering the jurisprudential mind-set underlying its adoption.2 2 As Judge Learned Hand said, the meaning of the various
provisions of the Constitution "is to be gathered from the words
they contain, read in the historical setting in which they were uttered. ' '2 3 Part of that setting is the philosophical outlook of the
framers. Immersed in the Weltanschauung of natural law, eighteenth
24
century Americans generally embraced its basic assumptions.
20 The phrase is translated as "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979). James Jackson of Georgia
voiced this fear in his statement to the House of Representatives: "There is a
maxim in law, and it will apply to bills of rights, that when you enumerate exemptions, the exceptions operate to the exclusion of all circumstances that are omitted;

consequently, unless you except every right from the grant of power, those omitted
are inferred to be resigned to the discretion of the Government." 1 ANNALS OF
CONGRESS 442 (J. Gales ed. 1834).
21 Id. at 439. As summarized by Story, "[t]his clause was manifestly introduced
to prevent any perverse, or ingenious misapplication of the well known maxim, that

an affirmation in particular cases implies a negation in all others ....
" 3J.

STORY,

COMMENTARIES-ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 751-52 (1970).
22 See Corwin, The 'Higher Law'Background ofAmerican ConstitutionalLaw, 42 HARV.

L. REV. 149, 365 (1928); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: FundamentalLaw in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 867 (1978). See also Gressman,
Bicentennializing Freedom of Expression, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 378, 393-95 (1990)
(drawing distinction between "natural rights" and "natural law" in the socio-political principles embraced during the American Revolution).
23 L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 3 (1958).
24 Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 305, 314 (1987); Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12
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The writings of the famed Lord Chief Justice of England, Sir
Edward Coke, played a substantial part in the perspective that Anglo-American law came to reflect. Lord Coke believed in the existence of a fundamental natural law which was enunciated in the
Magna Carta and which protected man's natural rights.2 5 In this
same tradition it is also noteworthy that Madison subscribed to
Locke's philosophy, using it as the foundation for the Ninth Amendment.2 6 Thus, retained rights were those freedoms that preceded
government, supervening any governmental action conflicting with
such rights.
III.

"UNALIENABLE

RIGHTS" AND THE IDEALS OF THE PREAMBLE
AS POINTS OF DEPARTURE

The most problematic issue for those who would argue from
the Ninth Amendment is whether there exists a reference point
from which a definition of retained rights can be gathered. The
challenge for judges is to find the authority to protect rights not
enumerated in the Constitution. 27 The skeptics 28 generally conclude, in a leap of logic, that Ninth Amendment rights do not
exist for lack of such a reference point. It is to this quintessential
question that we now turn.
Against the backdrop of a natural law world view with which
the framers were imbued, it is most appropriate to consider important contemporaneous American documents to ascertain
MICH. L. REV. 247, 248 (1914).

But seeJ. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 39 (1980)
("Although there were.., people who expected the Constitution to be informed by
natural law, this theme was far from universally accepted .... ").
25 Moore, supra note 3, at 227. Moore observed that the line of descent is direct
from Lord Coke's natural law and natural rights theory "through the English Declaration and Bill of Rights of 1688 and 1689, through John Locke's Second Treatise on
Civil Government, to the Bill of Rights of our early American state constitutions and
finally to the first ten amendments to the federal Constitution." Id.
26 L. LEVY, supra note 17, at 275 (referring to what Madison called " 'contemporaneous interpretations' of natural rights").
27 Halperin, Constitutional Review and 'Open-Ended' Clauses, 11 HARV. J. L. LAw &
PUB. POL'Y 97, 99 (1988).
28 Graglia, The 'Open-Ended' Clauses of the Constitution, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
87 (1988) ("To have to speak to a legally sophisticated audience on the 'openended' clauses of the Constitution is like being invited to a learned gathering and
asked to discourse on the Easter Bunny."); McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of
Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 89, 100-01 (1988) ("Open-ended
judicial review does not give greater protection to natural rights-it simply substitutes the judge's understanding of natural rights for the Constitution's."); Berger,
The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 16 (1980) ("The Constitution is not to
'be construed as a grant to the individual of inherent rights or liberties;' rather ...it
is a 'limitation ...of the power of the government itself.' ") (emphasis in original).
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rights of constitutional magnitude that were not enumerated in
the Constitution itself. As Professor Black asserted, the Declaration of Independence 29 and the Preamble 3" of the Constitution
are compelling points of departure:
If any human rights at all are shielded against denial or disparagement by the command of the Ninth Amendment, then
there could be no ... place as good to begin a search for their
ground as in the Declaration or in the preamble.... The Dec-

laration and the preamble are not the only places wherein such
fundamental values can be located. But there can be no sense
at all in our failing to seek in those documents whatever help
they can give in this quest-taking them seriously, getting
from them all we can.3 '
Among the "unalienable rights ' 3 2 of life and liberty, which ulti29 The passage of the Declaration of Independence most pertinent to retained
rights provides:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers
in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and
happiness.
The Declaration of Independence, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
30 The Preamble states: "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty
to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America." U.S. CONST. preamble.
31 Black, "Further Reflections on the ConstitutionalJustice of Livelihood," 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 1103, 1105-08 (1986).
32 Professor Henkin posited that:
[O]ur ancestors seem to have had two different notions: "reserved" or
retained rights, and inalienable rights. Under the first conception, the
people reserved for themselves that which they did not wish to submit to
the authority of the government they created. Inalienable rights, cited
in the Declaration of Independence, were presumably "natural rights"
to which all are entitled under any form of government and do not necessarily depend on the principle of popular sovereignty. (But see Justice
Bradley's dissenting opinion, in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 114-115 (1873) (suggesting they were inherited)). Reserved
and natural rights, of course, come together if one assumed that the
people would not and could not give away their natural rights, that they
retained them because they wished to or had to. Of course, the people
could retain rights in addition to their natural, inalienable ones.
Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1413-14 n.7 (1974). The
Ninth Amendment ostensibly embraces both reserved and natural rights, assuming
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mately were specifically referenced in the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, it is noteworthy that included among the cardinal principles of the Declaration is the
phrase "pursuit of happiness" 3 3 and the term "safety." Such values
connote ideals related to the quality of life. Lockean theory, for example, included within the principle, the pursuit of happiness, that
which delighted and contented the mind and a belief that indispensable to it were good health, reputation, and knowledge. 4
Prominent in both the Declaration of Independence and the
Preamble is the ideal of liberty. One author contended that "[t]he
[f]ramers began the Constitution with the Preamble as a statement
of purpose because the philosophical tradition that spawned their
political temperament viewed the preservation of liberty as the chief
objective of government." ' 35 The Preamble, then, set forth the most
important objectives of our Constitution. Most illuminating of
Ninth Amendment retained rights are the objectives "to secure the
Blessings of Liberty," and the formation of "a more perfect Union."
Each clause of the Preamble, however, set forth a cardinal American
principle that contributed to the Constitution's overall objective.
The first principle of the Preamble is the establishment of justice. The framers intended a continuing effort to bring our democracy and law as close to justice as possible. Through the Ninth
the merger Professor Henkin suggested. Such reserved rights, however, would
more properly encompass interpretations of fundamental concepts articulated in
the Declaration of Independence and Preamble, than rights found in "state sources
in existence at the time of the Constitution's adoption." Massey, supra note 24, at
326-27. While state statutes may inform concepts expressed in the Declaration and
Preamble, such state sources would not necessarily have the universal sanction that
attends national sources. For this reason, Massey's analysis of positive rights in an
historical context is less compelling than the conceptual framework he advances
under the rubric of natural rights.
33 The notion of happiness was quite prominent among the purposes underlying
the government at the time the Constitution was ratified. For example, New York's
act of ratification not only reflected this but also proved to be an antecedent of the

Ninth and Tenth Amendments. New York provided:
That the powers of government may be reassumed by the people whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness; that every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of government thereof, remains to the people of the several states, or to their
respective state governments, to whom they may have granted the same

1 DEBATES

IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION 327 (. Elliot 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
34 L. LEVY, supra note 17, at 276.
35 Essay, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and Individual Liberties, 40 VAND. L. REV.

1353 (1987).
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Amendment, the claim that our democracy is subject to the rule of
law can be vindicated.3 6 The second principle is the guarantee of
domestic tranquility. Implicit in this guarantee is the American
commitment to protect the minority from "the vicissitudes of shifting majorities."" The Preamble's reference to the common defence is another core principle.3 8 The framers intended to protect
the basic security of the individual, something we appreciate more
fully as we become increasingly aware of the consequences of insurrections in other countries.
Also included in the Preamble is the intent to promote the general welfare. To endure the tests of time, a constitution must provide the people with the means to correct injustices that occur in an
evolving society.3" Professor Black observed that "in a phrasal echo
that can hardly be accidental, means are furnished for serving this
very purpose, in the article I, section 8 empowerment of Congress
to tax and spend 'for the ...

general welfare.' "40 Thus, the framers

purposely set forth these underlying principles as evidence of their
intent to build a new nation that would secure important rights and
values through a compact with the people.4"
Although liberty and all that it connotes philosophically and
historically is the foundation of our system, it is especially significant
that the reference in the Preamble is to the blessings that flow from
liberty. The blessings of liberty are ostensibly something greater
than liberty simpliciter, such as is referred to in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Thus, by drawing from the Preamble to con36

See Barber, The Ninth Amendment: Inkblot or Another HardNut to Crack?, 64

]KENT L. REV. 67, 84 (1988).
37 Tribe, Contrasting Constitutional Visions:

CHI.[-

Of Real and Unreal Differences, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 105 (1987).
38 It is at least interesting and perhaps noteworthy that this is the only clause in
the original final version of the Preamble lacking any capitalization.
39 In 1987, Congressman Rodino provided the following introduction to the
Constitution:
[A] constitution must do more than provide for restraints against the
illegal use of power. It must also give the people a means of dealing
with their day-to-day problems, continually correcting the injustices that
arise in our society. A constitution that is not adaptable-that constrains the government from acting for the general welfare of the people-will not long survive. As the oldest written Constitution in
continuous operation, our Constitution has survived because it offers
the means of remedying present ills without sacrificing past gains.
Rodino, "Foreword" to The Constitution of the United States of America, H. Doc. No.
100-94, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. v-vi (1987).
40 Black, supra note 31, at 1106.
41 See Rodino, The Compact with the People, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 471, 473-74
(1987).
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strue the retained rights of the Ninth Amendment, an expansion of
rights beyond what is contained in the liberty of the Due Process
Clauses is properly effected.
Such a construction is consistent with the "natural liberty" discussed by William Blackstone, the eighteenth century legal scholar.
Blackstone posited that natural liberty was comprised of the absolute rights of security, liberty, and property.4 2 The rights of natural
liberty, however, were subject to the restrictions of natural law,
which safeguarded against one person harming another in the exercise of his natural liberty.
As an element of Lockean natural liberty, property has been
broadly defined. Madison wrote in his essay entitled Property:
[A] man has property in his opinions and free communication
of them. He has a property of peculiar value in his religious
opinions, and in the profession and practices dictated by them.
He has property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of
his person. He has an equal property in the free use of his
faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ
them. In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.4 3
Thus, the blessings of liberty comprise more than simple freedom from restraint; rather, there is a qualitative threshold of government that derives from and is expected by the people. As Chief
Justice Marshall stated: "The government of the Union ...

is, em-

phatically, and truly, a government of the people. In form and in
substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them,
and are to be exercised .
42

2 W.

.

. for their benefit." 4 4

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

129, 134, 138

(1865). One commentator described Blackstone's theories on natural liberty as
follows:
[N]atural liberty consisted of three absolute personal rights: (1) personal security, which "consists in a person's ... uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation;" (2)
personal liberty, which "consists in the power of loco-motion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own
inclination may direct without imprisonment or restraint;" and (3) property, which "consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of...
acquisitions, without any control or diminution.
Men possessed these rights in full measure, subject only to the limitations of natural law, which provided that no person should harm another in the exercise of his liberty.
Essay, supra note 34, at 1353-54 (quoting W. BLACKSTONE, supra) (footnotes
omitted).
43 L. LEVY, supra note 17, at 276-77 (citing National Gazette (Philadelphia), March
29, 1792, reprinted in, 14 THE PAPERS OF MADISON 226).
44 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 404-05 (1819).
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The most important principle of the Preamble, as it relates both
to the construction of the Constitution as a whole and to the Ninth
Amendment in particular, is its command "to form a more perfect
Union." It is the more perfect union that is the ideal society, a nation with justice and one that would secure the blessings of liberty
not just for ourselves, but for our posterity.
This command is the touchstone and the challenge for all of us,
especially for those who bear the responsibility of interpreting the
Constitution. Professor Lawson summed it up well:
[T]he Preamble . . .unlocks some of the secrets of constitutional reading and interpretation . . . It teaches us who we
ought to be . . .as we constitute government. Its rhetorical

force suggests that we are part of a continuing community that
began with the [firamers and will continue so long as the
American people have the character that the Preamble
describes .

The more perfect union facilitates the blessings of liberty and the
protection of the general welfare of all present and future Americans, regardless of station, heritage, or belief.
The clause, "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity," implies that each generation must act as guardian
and protector of the rights inherited from the preceding generation.
These rights may then be handed down untrammelled and
unimpaired to the next generation.
Although the Preamble's grand principles were adopted by the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention without objection,4 6 the
first Justice Harlan's opinion inJacobson v. Massachusetts4 7 stated that
the Preamble "has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the government of the United States,
or on any of its departments."' 48 This does not mean, however, that
the Preamble is irrelevant. On the contrary, the Preamble should be
the focal point in constitutional interpretation. It declares the fram45

Lawson, The Literary Force of the Preamble, 39

MERCER

L.

REV.

879, 886 (1988).

46 Preamble,reprinted in, D. MAHONEY, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-

1435 (1986).
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
Id. at 14. Although the Preamble was virtually excised from the Constitution
in this case, there is no historical indication that the Preamble was not intended to
be directly judicially enforceable. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 161-68 (M. Jensen ed. 1976). Even assuming arguendo
that the Preamble has been interpreted correctly, judicial effect through the vehicle
of the Ninth Amendment is not thereby foreclosed. Moreover, it is not suggested
here that the Preamble or the Ninth Amendment in any fashion confers power on
the government; on the contrary, rights operate as limitations on governmental
power.
TION
47
48
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ers' "constitutional aspiration" 4 9 and gives the document as a whole

its direction. Moreover, the Preamble lays a constitutionally based
foundation for the legitimate enforcement of Ninth Amendment
rights.

IV.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON INTERPRETATION

There seem to be two primary bases of criticism regarding
Ninth Amendment jurisprudence. One, which has come to be
characterized as the interpretivism/noninterpretivism debate,5 °
holds that recognition of retained rights is less than legitimate
because they are not enumerated in the Constitution. Such extra-constitutional protection, the argument goes, is based on
nothing more than speculation and unfettered law-making. The
second, increasingly popular criticism is that, because the Ninth
Amendment has rarely been interpreted, retained rights simply
do not exist. Because neither rationale is well-grounded, it is appropriate that their deficiencies be considered lest the theory we
are advancing regarding interpretation of the Ninth Amendment
be dismissed on such dubious grounds.
With respect to the first criticism, some clarification of terminology is in order. Interpretive review seeks legitimacy by deriving law from the constitutional text.5" Professor Grey has more
recently subcategorized interpretivism to include textualism (reliance solely on the words within the four corners of the Constitution) and originalism (reliance on the actual original
understanding of constitutional provisions).5 2 In contrast,
noninterpretivism "accepts the legitimacy of judicial enforce53
ment of an unwritten constitution.
Regardless of whether one considers such constructs to be
helpful, even interpretivists should be satisfied with an analysis
that discerns the meaning of retained rights by looking to the
Declaration and the Preamble. A recent commentator has prop49 Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 211, 213

(1988).
50 Professor Grey, the father of the dichotomy, has himself characterized the
rubric as "stylistically barbarous." Id. at 220. See generally W. MURPHY,J. FLEMING &
W. HARRIS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 289, 315-16 (1986).
51 Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975). See
also M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61-90 (1982)
(examining the implications of interpretivism and "the problem of the legitimacy of
the noninterpretive review the Supreme Court exercises as it formulates and protects human rights").
52 Grey, supra note 49, at 212 n.2.
53 Id. at 220.
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erly observed that "[a] vital constitutionalism depends upon the
ability of Americans 5to4 read the constitutional documents entrusted to their care."

The Ninth Amendment means what it says. We have constitutional rights that have not been specified in the body of the
Constitution. The reference to retained rights, however, is contained within the body of the Constitution. Even under an interpretivist textualist mode of analysis, then, there is support within
the four corners of the Constitution for the proposition that
unenumerated rights of constitutional dimension have been retained for the people's benefit and protection. In fact, Professor
Ely contends that "[t]he conclusion that the Ninth Amendment
was intended to signal the existence of federal constitutional
rights beyond those specifically enumerated in the Constitution
is the only conclusion its language seems comfortably able
to support."55 Moreover, at least as to the Preamble of the Constitution, the basis for divining the substance of Ninth Amendment rights is not extra-constitutional. Professor Sager
commented that "[w]e could, of course, simply ignore the ninth
amendment; but, without more, that would be an unjustified
lapse from our commitment to serve the explicit provisions of the
Constitution. "56
Similarly, the originalist prong of the interpretivist analysis is
amply satisfied by the historical record. As previously discussed,
the framers were clear in their intention to safeguard unenumerated rights through the adoption of the Ninth Amendment. In
addition, it is unlikely that the framers would have enacted an
amendment devoid of enforceable content, especially where the
amendment ostensibly addressed their specific concerns.5 7
Although they are clearly not of the same mold as those who
disparage the Ninth Amendment based on notions of original intent, 58 some commentators, nevertheless, appear unduly to re54 Anastaplo, How to Read the Constitution of the United States, 17 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 1
(1985) (emphasis in original).
55 J. ELY, supra note 24, at 38.
56 Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fifth. But
What on Earth Can You Do With the Ninth Amendment?, 64 CH.[-]KENT L. REV. 239,
257 (1988).
57 See Massey, supra note 24, at 316-17.
58 E.g., Cooper, Limited Government and Individual Liberty: The Ninth Amendment's
Forgotten Lessons, 4J.L. & POL. 63, 73-74 (1987); Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent,
and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 826 (1986). Abrams observed that
"[i]t is thus all the more distressing to see the Ninth Amendment itself disparaged
by people who, in other contexts, seek to return to the original understanding of
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strict potential recognition of retained rights by imposing an
additional requirement that they be implicit in several enumerated rights or in the structure of the Bill of Rights as a whole. 59
While such criteria may be viewed by some as bolstering the argument in support of retained rights, the conclusion that the"amendment is not itself the fount of any such rights ' 60 appears
to contradict the express language of the amendment. Such a
construction, ironically, appears to "disparage" Ninth Amendment rights based on the Constitution's enumeration of certain
other rights. 6 '
The second basis on which the Ninth Amendment is often
relegated to insignificance is its relative quiescence. In response
to Professor Tribe's description of the Ninth Amendment as "a
uniquely central text in any attempt to take seriously the process
of construing the Constitution, '6 2 Justice Antonin Scalia retorted
that "[i]f it [the language of the Ninth Amendment and the Preamble] is so uniquely central, how come not a single case has
63
been decided under it in over 200 years?"
the Framers." Abrams, The Ninth Amendment and the Protection of UnenumeratedRights,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 93, 96 (1988).
59 See, e.g., Tribe, ContrastingConstitutionalVisions: Of Real and Unreal Differences, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 107 (1987). One commentator uses this analysis under
the rubric of collateral rights. See Mitchell, The Ninth Amendment and theJurisprudence
of Original Intention, 74 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1731-34 (1986).
60 Tribe, supra note 58, at 107 (emphasis in original); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 776 n.14 (2d ed. 1988).
61 Others agree that such a position is inconsistent with a plain reading of the
Ninth Amendment. See Levinson, ConstitutionalRhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64
CHI.[-]KENT. L. REV. 131, 141-42 (1988) and Mitchell, supra note 59, at 1731-34.
62 Tribe, supra note 58, at 100 (emphasis in original). Professor Tribe asserts
that "only the ninth amendment is directly and avowedly addressed to the very subject of how the Constitution is to be construed," id. (emphasis in original), and that
it is "the only provision of the Constitution that speaks to us directly in our capacity
as readers of that document." Id. at 109. Apparently, Tribe did not consider article IV, § 3, cl.2, which prescribes: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so
construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular
State"; and the Eleventh Amendment, which states: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
63 Plaza, Scalia Calls for JudicialRestraint, The Setonian, October 5, 1989, at 1, col.
1. A version of this article was presented at the symposium entitled "The Bicentennial of the Bill of Rights" sponsored by the Seton Hall Law School, which took
place on September 28, 1989. In his discussion of cruel and unusual punishment,
Professor Wefing suggested that construction of the Eighth Amendment might be
illuminated by looking to the practices and laws of other countries. See Wefing,
Cruel & Unusual Punishment 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 478, 487-88 (1990). Justice

512

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 20:498

Not only is Justice Scalia mistaken regarding the number of
cases relying on the Ninth Amendment, 64 but as Professor Tribe
has so eloquently stated, "judicial restraint is but another form of
judicial activism." ' 65 Of course, mere desuetude does not imply
non-existence." Professor Sager couched the issue in rhetorical
terms:
One question is bound to arise from a serious encounter with
the ninth amendment: have we (judges, scholars, and other
constitutional decisionmakers and commentators) been getting it wrong all these years? After all, the ninth amendment
has been relegated to a dark corner of the constitutional closet
into which almost no one seems anxious to poke. If such a
neglected piece of the Constitution is really as central to the
meaning of rights-bearing provisions as I have suggested, it is
reasonable to wonder whether we have bungled the business
of constitutional interpretation in some chronic, endemic way.
(There lurks the opposite point, as well: namely, that an interpretive adverse possession sets in after 200 years pursuant to
which claims that jar settled sensibilities should be barred.)6 7
Such a characterization only underscores our view that concerns
about judicial overreaching are grossly overstated.
Scalia's rejoinder was "that every tinhorn dictatorship in the world has a bill of
rights," thereby making the point that such laws are on the books, yet have no
meaning. Richardson, Scalia Says Separationof Powers Gives Bill of Rights Staying Power,
Newark Star-Ledger, September 29, 1989, at 3. Justice Scalia's interpretation of the
Ninth Amendment would appear to expose the United States to the same criticism.
64 See Part V of this article infra; supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text; Tribe,
supra note 58, at 103.
65 L. TRIBE, supra note 59, at viii; see also Black, supra note 31, at 1112 ("Sins
against human rights are not only those of commission, but those of omission as
well.").
66 "The entire absence for a long period of time, even for centuries, of a precedent for an asserted right should have the effect to cause the courts to proceed with
caution before recognizing the right, for fear that they may thereby invade the
province of the law-making power; but such absence, even for all time, is not conclusive of the question as to the existence of the right." Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins., 122 Ga. 190, 191 50 S.E. 68, 69 (1905), wherein the Georgia Supreme
Court, perJustice Cobb, rendered the first American decision, with the exception of
Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) and Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886), which recognized a right of privacy.
67 Sager, supra note 55, at 261-62. Professor Grey answers the following rhetorical question in the negative: "Even if we originally had judicially enforceable
unenumerated constitutional rights, might we not have gradually lost them through
a process of interpretive development driven by the movement toward a more democratic ideal of legislation and a more positivistic conception of law?" Grey, supra
note 49, at 217.
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JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES, PAST AND FUTURE

As Charles Black has pointed out, "there has been no
Supreme Court Justice in this century who has not voted to support some right that could on no common-sense basis be said to
be named in the Constitution; the great majority have cast such
votes in some numbers over a wide range." '68 Indeed, a great
variety of unenumerated constitutional rights have been recognized by the Court, including the right to attend and report on
criminal trials, 69 a presumption of innocence and the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials,7" political
freedom, 7 freedom of personal choice in matters concerning
family life,7 2 the right to choose whether to have children,7 3 the
right to make marital decisions,"4 the right to follow one's chosen
profession, 7" the right of interstate travel, 76 the right to retain
American citizenship by birth subject only to expatriation,7 7 the
right of privacy, 78 access to the courts, 79 the right to vote, 8 ° freedom of association,8" equal protection of federal laws,8 2 and the
right to direct the upbringing of one's children.8 3 Recognition of
retained rights, then, should not be particularly threatening.
Black, supra note 31, at 1111.
See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
70 See, e.g.,Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510 (1979); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
71 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
72 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality
opinion).
73 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
74 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men").
75 See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474 (1959); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
76 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v.Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
77 See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
78 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
79 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
80 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
81 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353 (1937); DeGregory v. Attorney Gen. of N.H., 383 U.S. 825 (1966); U.S. v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
82 See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
83 See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
68
69
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However, until Griswold v. Connecticut8 4 the Ninth Amendment was rarely invoked.," Clearly, Griswold was the turning
point for the Ninth Amendment. The initial recognition of a
Ninth Amendment right of privacy was brought about primarily
by Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion. In resting the opinion
squarely on the Ninth Amendment, Justice Goldberg found a
right of privacy retained by the people that precluded Connecticut from proscribing the use of drugs or medical devices for purposes of contraception. Justice Goldberg explained:
The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that
the [f]ramers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights
specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional
amendments.
...To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so
deep-rooted in our society as the right of privacy in marriage
may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so
many words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution
is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and give it no effect whatsoever. Moreover, a judicial construction that this fundamental right is not protected by the Constitution because it is not
mentioned in explicit terms by one of the first eight amendments or elsewhere in the Constitution would violate the
Ninth Amendment .... 86
Justice Goldberg concluded that the Ninth Amendment must be
interpreted in light of three sources: (1) The traditions and collective conscience of the nation; (2) emanations of specific constitutional guarantees; and (3) the experience of free societies. 87 Chief
Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and Justice Goldberg (in the con84 381 U.S. 479 (1965). While Griswold was on its way to the Supreme Court,
Professor Redlich foresaw the impact of the Ninth Amendment on the case. Redlich, Are There "'CertainRights... Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787, 807-

09 (1962).

85 See supra note 5.
Interestingly, a district court, in holding the seizure of the steel mills by Presidential Order unconstitutional as beyond the scope of executive authority, indicated that the Ninth Amendment limited the power of the executive and other
branches of the federal government. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
103 F. Supp. 569, 573 n.3 (D.D.C. 1952), aff'd (without mention of the Ninth
Amendment), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
86 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488, 491 (GoldbergJ., concurring).
87 Id. at 493. See also Van Alstyne, Slouching Toward Bethlehem with the Ninth Amendment (Book Review), 91 YALE L.J. 207, 209 n.14 (1981) (reviewing C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981)).
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curring opinion), and Justices Douglas and Clark (in the opinion of
the Court),8 8 went on record in support of the Ninth Amendment
right of familial privacy in Griswold.
Another instance wherein the Supreme Court recognized the
Ninth Amendment as the locus of unenumerated rights was in the
case of Stanley v. Illinois.8 9 The Stanley Court invalidated an Illinois
statute that made the children of an unwed father wards of the state
upon their mother's death, without a hearing as to the fitness of the
father as a parent. In an opinion by Justice White, the Court held
that although due process does not require a hearing in every conceivable case of government impairment of a private interest, where
an important familial interest is at stake, presuming rather than
proving Stanley's unfitness solely because it is more convenient did
not satisfy due process because the state's legitimate interest in protecting children was rendered de minimis if Stanley were in fact a
fit parent. In arriving at this result, Justice White,9" citing Justice
Goldberg's opinion in Griswold, reaffirmed that "It]he integrity of
the

family

unit

has

found

protection

in

.

.

.

the Ninth

Amendment."'"
In Roe v. Wade 92 an appeal was taken from the district court's
determination that certain state criminal abortion legislation violated the Ninth Amendment.9 3 Although the Court, in affirming,
chose to ground its decision on the Fourteenth Amendment, it did
88 One commentator criticizes the lack of any explication in the majority opinion
regarding the Ninth Amendment: "[T]he Court quoted, but left to the reader's
imagination, the relevance of the Ninth Amendment." Wellington, Common Law
Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE

L.J.221, 228 (1973).
89 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
90 Significantly, in his opinion for the Court Justice White, who had refrained
from commenting on the Ninth Amendment in Griswold, here approved. See id. at
651 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (GoldbergJ., concurring)). Perhaps even more significantly, Justice Stewart, who dissented and disapproved of the Ninth Amendment in Griswold, agreed with Justice White as did
Justice Marshall, who did not sit on the Griswold Court. See id. at 645.
91 Id. at 651 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring)).
92 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
93 Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970). "While the Ninth Amendment right to choose to have an abortion is not unqualified or unfettered, a statute
designed to regulate the circumstances of abortions must restrict its scope to compelling state interests." Id. at 1223. Whether invocation of the Ninth Amendment
has as a concomitant the strict scrutiny standard is an open question. See Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (Justice
Goldberg would apparently think so). Many commentators concur. See, e.g., Ringold, supra note 16, at 51; Rhoades & Patula, Ninth Amendment: A Survey of Theory and
Practice in the Federal Courts Since Griswold v. Connecticut, 50 DEN. L.J. 153, 175
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accept the district court's characterization of the right infringed:
"[T]his right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or as the District Court determined, in
the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi'' 4
nate her pregnancy. 1
Justice Douglas, concurring in Roe's companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 5 explained the retained rights of the Ninth Amendment by specific reference to the Preamble:
[A] catalogue of these rights includes customary, traditional, and time-honored rights, amenities, privileges, and immunities that come within the sweep of "the Blessings of
Liberty" mentioned in the preamble to the Constitution.
First is the autonomous control over the development and expression
of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality.
Second is freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life respecting marriage,divorce, procreation,contraception, and the education
and upbringing of children.
This right of privacy was called by Mr. Justice Brandeis
the right "to be let alone."
Third is the freedom to care for one's health and person, freedom
from bodily restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf.96
In the area of marital and familial privacy rights, Justice Goldberg's
reliance on the Ninth Amendment in his opinion in Griswold9 7 has
continued to be quoted 8 and cited by the Court with approval. 99
One of the more interesting developments in the jurisprudence
of the Ninth Amendment arose in the case of Buckley v. Valeo,"'0
(1973); Comment, Unenumerated Rights-Substantive Due Process, the Ninth Amendment,
andJohn Stuart Mill, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 922, 936-38.
94 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
95
96

410 U.S. 179 (1973).
Id. at 210-13 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (footnotes

omitted).
97 381 U.S. 479, 486-90 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
98 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 n.12

(1977).
99 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Smith v. Org. of Foster
Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 n.46 (1977).
100 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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which involved various constitutional challenges to several provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act and its 1974 amendments. In the Court's answers to certified questions regarding the
constitutionality of expenditure limitations, the Ninth Amendment
appears to have been accepted as a partial ground to hold the limitations unconstitutional.' 0 ' Hence, it may be inferred from the
Court's opinion that there is a Ninth Amendment right to political
freedom in the context of elections.
Another instance in which extensive reliance was placed on the
Ninth Amendment °2 was in the case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia.'°3 Chief Justice Burger, in delivering the plurality opinion,
stated:
The State argues that the Constitution nowhere spells out
a guarantee for the right of the public to attend trials, and that
accordingly no such right is protected. The possibility that
such a contention could be made did not escape the notice of
the Constitution's draftsmen; they were concerned that some
important rights might be thought disparaged because not
specifically guaranteed....
But arguments such as the State makes have not precluded recognition of important rights not enumerated....
101 The following questions and answers were submitted in Buckley:

3. Does any statutory limitation, or do the particular limitations in the
challenged statutes, on the amounts that individuals or organizations
may contribute or expend in connection with elections for federal office
violate the rights of one or more of the plaintiffs under the First, Fifth,
or Ninth Amendments or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States?
(d) Does 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate such rights, in
that it limits to $1,000 the independent (not on behalf of the candidate)
expenditures of any person relative to an identified candidate?
Answer: Yes.
4. Does any statutory limitation, or do the particular limitations in the
challenged statutes, on the amounts that candidates for elected federal
office may expend in their campaigns violate the rights of one or more
of the plaintiffs under the First or Ninth Amendment or the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
(a) Does 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate such rights, in
that it forbids expenditures by candidates for federal office in excess of
the amounts specified in 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)?
Answer: Yes.
Id. at 59-60 n.67. Whether the Court was using "or" in the conjunctive or disjunctive is unclear.
102 Abrams, supra note 58, at 95.
103 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
See generally Abrams, supra note 58 (discussing the
Court's "proper" application of the Ninth Amendment in Richmond).
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For example, the rights of association and privacy, the right to
be presumed innocent, and the right to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial, as
well as the right to travel, appear nowhere in the Constitution
or Bill of Rights. Yet these important but unarticulated rights
have nonetheless been found to share constitutional protection in common with explicit guarantees.' 0 4
Many other courts, both state' 0 5 and federal l"6 have also applied the Ninth Amendment to protect unenumerated rights. In the
area of privacy, the Ninth Amendment has been invoked frequently.
One case that clearly recognized the Ninth Amendment as a protection of privacy arose when a postal employee was terminated because he was living with a woman to whom he was not married. In
ordering his reinstatement, Judge Peckham stated unequivocally,
"Mindel's termination because of his private sex life violates the right to privacy guaranteedby the Ninth Amendment. ""0 7 Many of the cases involving Ninth Amendment privacy rights imply that innocuous private
conduct is protected. Thus, when schools have sought to dictate the
length of a student's hair, the amendment has been successfully invoked. The Eighth Circuit observed that "[t]he common theme underlying decisions striking down hairstyle regulations is that the
Constitution guarantees rights other than those specifically enumerated, and that the right to govern one's personal appearance is one
of those guaranteed rights."' 0 8
It remains to be seen whether the Ninth Amendment will play
an important role in the area of sexual preference.' 0 9 In Hardwick v.
Richmond, 488 U.S. at 579-80 (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., Filan v. Martin, 38 Wash. App. 91, 97, 684 P.2d 769, 773 (1984)
("The ninth amendment insures those rights deemed fundamental by history and
tradition."); Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 461 P.2d 375 (1969)
(where the court recognized that a general ban on immoral conduct would raise
serious Ninth Amendment concerns).
106 See, e.g., U.S. v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982) ("the ninth amendment supports the existence of rights not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution").
107 Mindel v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485, 488 (N.D.
Cal. 1970) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Cf.Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d
1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (where dismissal for immorality not affecting the employee's
104
105

job was reversed under Due Process analysis).

108 Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971); see also Massie v. Henry,
455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972) (relying on due process and equal protection
grounds); Black Stull v. School Bd. of Western BeaverJr.-Sr. High School, 459 F.2d
339 (3d Cir. 1972) (due process). The Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Ind.
Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) in dictum declined to equate hair style
with symbolic speech.
109 See Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 973-77 (E.D. Wis.
1980), modified sub nom., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) (one's
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Bowers,"' the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
Georgia sodomy statute infringed upon Hardwick's fundamental
constitutional right to engage in private sexual relations with another adult. The court rested its decision primarily on the Ninth
Amendment. Although the Supreme Court reversed this decision, it
did not reach the Ninth Amendment issue."' In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that prior Supreme Court decisions indicated that the intimate relations to be protected by the
Constitution are not limited to those involving procreation, 11 2 nor is
the marital relationship the only association to be protected against
governmental interference.' 13
How the jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment develops will
depend to a large degree on how it is viewed by the Court's newest
members, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. They do not appear anxious to engage in the issue. As Justice Blackmun pointed
out in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services:

1 14

The plurality does not even mention, much less join, the true
jurisprudential debate underlying this case: whether the Constitution includes an "unenumerated" general right to privacy
as recognized in many of our decisions, most notably Griswold
v. Connecticut, and Roe, and, more specifically, whether and to
what extent such a right to privacy extends to matters of
childbearing and family life, including abortion."' 5
If his comments at Seton Hall's symposium commemorating the
bicentennial of the Bill of Rights are any indication, Justice Scalia is
not likely to take kindly to arguments grounded on the Ninth
Amendment.1 16 Justice Kennedy, however, expressed some appresexual preferences are protected by the First and Ninth Amendments), cert. denied,

58 U.S.L.W. 3541 (1990).

110 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
111 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 n.8 ("Respondent does not defend the
judgment below based on the Ninth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, or
the Eighth Amendment.").

112 Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1211.

113 Id. at 1212. Justice Blackmun echoed this point in his dissenting opinion:
"[W]e protect the family because it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of

individuals, not because of a preference for stereotypical households." 478 U.S. at
205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

57 U.S.L.W. 5023 (U.S. July 3, 1989).
115 Id. at 5038 (BlackmunJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citation omitted). ChiefJustice Rehnquist, in a part of his opinion joined only by Justices White
and Kennedy, acknowledged their "failure to join in a 'great issues' debate." Id. at
5031.
114

116 Schwartz, Scalia Gives Profs a Good Lashing, Res Ipsa Loquitur, Seton Hall School
of Law, Nov. 1989, at 5-6; Plaza, supra note 63; Richardson, supra note 63.
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ciation for the constitutional significance of the Ninth Amendment
at his confirmation hearings. 117
VI.

FINDING LOST FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS:

CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATION, A MORE PERFECT UNION,

AND AFFIRMATIVE GOVERNMENTAL DUTY
UNDER THE NINTH AMENDMENT

At this juncture, we turn to a discussion of what rights are in
need of protection by the Ninth Amendment. As one commentator has suggested, the Ninth Amendment "expresses a Constitutional desire to protect rights not specifically identified in the
document, leaving it to future interpreters to advance the project
'
of discerning and protecting constitutional rights." 18
Of course, the right of privacy, as set forth in Griswold, is the
right most closely associated with the Ninth Amendment. This
right of privacy was described by Justice Brandeis as "the right to
be let alone.""'
But what other rights does the Ninth Amendment protect? At a minimum, it should afford protection to
rights that are essential to the dignity of each individual, that dignity that was assumed to be among the natural rights to which the
framers referred.
By looking to the Preamble, the retained rights should be
given definition by the aspirational character of the phrase, a
more perfect union. Is it not an assault upon one's dignity to live
in poverty? Essential to dignity, then, is survival, what Professor
Black has called "a constitutional justice of livelihood." ' 12' For,
117 See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF ANTHONY M. KENNEDY
TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, S. EXEC. REP.

No. 100-13 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1988). Judge Kennedy testified that the
framers had believed "that the first eight amendments were not an exhaustive catalogue of all human rights" and that "the Court is treating [the Ninth Amendment]
as something of a reserve clause, to be held in the event that the phrase 'liberty'
and the other spacious phrases in the Constitution appear to be inadequate for the
Court's decision." Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
The classic saving clause is found in § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1875 (revised in
1948). The original language dealt with the administration of maritime law, "saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common
law is competent to give it." Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354, 362 (1959) (footnote omitted). It is interesting to note that the reference
in Romero is to the common law, perhaps as evanescent a concept as "rights retained by the people."
I 18 Macedo, Reasons, Rhetoric, and the Ninth Amendment: A Comment on Sanford Levinson, 64 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 163, 169 (1988).
''9 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
dissenting).
120 Black, supra note 31, at 1114.

(1928)

(Brandeis, J.,
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of what benefit is liberty without life or an opportunity to pursue
happiness?12 1 Implying such a constitutional duty from a right
22
finds support in Hohfeldian jurisprudence.
The Ninth Amendment, using the Declaration and the Preamble as its guides, is the appropriate vehiclefor vindicating retained rights that have typically been recognized under the
Fourteenth Amendment. As one commentator has stated: "The
Court has attempted to fit square pegs into round holes, by forcing rights that might properly be protected by the broad language of the Ninth Amendment into constitutional provisions
where no amount of pushing can comfortably make fit.' 1 2 3 In
cases brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the
Supreme Court has refused to raise to constitutional stature the
right to housing, the right to welfare, and the right to education.
In Lindsey v. Normet, 124 portions of Oregon's Forcible Entry
and Wrongful Detainer Statute, which provides the landlord with
a method of eviction of a tenant who has not paid rent, was challenged under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute's early trial provision and the provision that
placed a limitation on litigable issues. The Court found that the
state's interest in providing a rapid and peaceful settlement process for disputes between landlord and tenant met the rational
basis test.
The tenants, however, argued that a more stringent standard
than mere rationality was necessary.' 25 They. stated that "the
,need for decent shelter' and the 'right to retain peaceful posses121

Mitchell, supra note 58, at 1727.

J.STONE,

LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 139 (1964) (Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, the noted legal philosopher, juxtaposed right and duty as 'jural
correlatives"). The few situations wherein the Constitution has been held to impose upon the state an affirmative duty of providing care and protection with respect to particular individuals are in those instances where the state has taken a
person into its custody and has thereby deprived him of his freedom. See DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Servs., 109 S.Ct. 998, 1004-05 (1989).
It has been held that a state must provide adequate medical care to incarcerated
prisoners and that a state must provide involuntarily committed mental patients
with services necessary to ensure "reasonable safety" to them from themselves and
from each other. Id. at 1005. See also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)
(retarded individual who was involuntarily committed has a constitutional right to
reasonably sale conditions of confinement under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
123 Mitchell, supra note 59, at 1727.
124 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
125 Id. at 73.
122
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sion of one's home' are fundamental interests which are particularly important to the poor and which may be trenched upon only
after the State demonstrates some superior interest."1 2 6 In response to this contention, the Court found that there was no
"constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular
quality, or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the
real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease without
the payment of rent or otherwise contrary to the terms of the
relevant agreement."'' 2 7 Thus, the Court found that there was no
fundamental right to housing under the narrow set of circumstances presented. With the emerging crisis of homelessness,
however, the need for shelter has become acute. Dignity and justice would appear to require the state to address this crisis
pursu28
rights.
constitutional
retained
secure
to
duty
ant to its
In Dandridge v. Williams, 129 the Supreme Court upheld a part
of Maryland's public welfare program that was challenged under
the Equal Protection Clause. The program imposed an upper
limit on the total amount of money any one family unit could
receive. This amount was based on the number of children in the
family and the circumstances under which the family lived. The
standard increased with each additional person in the household;
however, the increments became proportionately small to the
point where a cap was placed on the family's monthly income.
The Court found that Maryland's scheme met the rational
basis test in that the state had a legitimate interest in "encouraging employment and in avoiding discrimination between welfare
families and the families of the working poor.'1 3 0 Survival, it is
submitted, is a "Blessing of Liberty" secured by the Ninth
Amendment.
Finally, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, ' 3 1

the Court upheld, against a challenge under the Equal Protection
Clause, the constitutionality of a property tax system used to finance education in the school district. The system had led to
126

Id.

Id. at 74.
"The law not only regards life and member, and protects every man in the
enjoyment of them, but also furnishes him with every thing necessary for their support. For there is no man so indigent or wretched, but he may demand a supply
sufficient for all the necessities of life, from the more opulent part, of the community ..
" W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, reprinted in, 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 388, 390 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987).
127
128

129
130

131

397 U.S. 471 (1970).
Id. at 486.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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large differences in the amount spent on the education of individual children. Districts with lower property values had to make a
greater effort to raise an amount equal to that raised in areas with
higher property values. The Court held that, although education
was of great importance, it was not a fundamental right explicitly
or implicitly protected under the Constitution. 32 Again, it would
appear that education is among the "unalienable rights" that is a
blessing of liberty protected by the Ninth Amendment. Moreover, education relates to the well-being of the family, which has
33
been recognized as a concern of the Ninth Amendment.1
Certainly, government policy in this century has contributed
to a distribution of wealth that creates poverty and keeps people
impoverished. To the extent that the government, state or federal, affects the income level of its citizens and forces many to live
with incomes below the subsistence or survival level, those policies require redress pursuant to the Ninth Amendment.
Many actions have been taken by the government, including
direct government-related employment in defense plants, subsidies for agribusiness, tax policies, and failed public schools,
which work to keep people in abject poverty. 34 These actions
should be measured against the fundamental right protected by
the Ninth Amendment to a minimum quality of life in terms of a
certain minimal income that affords decent shelter, clothing and
food. The compact with the people, which requires payment of
taxes, requires no less.
VII.

POST SCRIPT:

THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION

Constitutional decision-makers cannot ignore the spirit of
the Constitution by adopting narrow, wooden interpretations.

Those responsible for governing and interpreting the Constitution are subject to the commands of the Preamble to help in the
establishment of a more perfect union and to help secure the
blessings of liberty. A realization of these objectives may be
achieved through the vehicle of the Ninth Amendment.
As Chief Justice Marshall stated in Marbury v. Madison: "It
cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is inId. at 35.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
134 See Edelman, Minimum Income: Legislative Prerogativeor Constitutional Right?, Res
Ipsa Loquitur, Georgetown University Law Center, Fall 1988, at 10, 12-15 (arguing
for the proposition using substantive due process and equal protection as theoretical bases).
132
133
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tended to be without effect."'' 1 5 The Ninth Amendment is an integral part of American constitutional rights. And "the spirit of
an instrument, especially of a constitution, is to be respected not
1 36
less than its letter."'
135 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 475 (A.
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("obvious ... that there ought always to be a
constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitutional provisions").
136 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 122, 202 (1819).

